Mindanao Week of Peace 2008

As Muslims and mujahideen…we cannot help but make peace,
not war. The Holy Qu’ran, in essence and its inimitable style,
commands us: “If the enemy inclines to peace,
so you must also incline to peace.”

- Prof.Nur Misuari MNLF Chairman

THE MINDANAO CONFLICT AND THE COLONIAL AND POST-COLONIAL INITIATIVES TOWARDS MOROLAND

This chapter provides the historical background of the Mindanao conflict that led to the signing of the peace agreement in 1996. It is divided into three sections. The first section presents a historical sketch of the Moro struggle for a Mindanao homeland. It traces the cause of the conflict, its costs, and provides a picture of its complexity. Section two describes the various initiatives tried to resolve the Moro problem by the colonial powers up to the present Philippine state. It specifically deals with the issue of conflict management, its historical evolution, the efforts and guiding principles and outcomes. Finally this chapter ends by highlighting the important provisions of the 1996 accord and discusses their limitations and implications in the search for peace and development in Mindanao. As a whole, this chapter attempts to provide the needed historical context that will assist in evaluating the approaches and programmes of the international community after the signing of the accord in 1996. The understanding of the history, nature and complexity of the conflict is a necessary ingredient in constructing a responsive peace and development program.

A. The Struggle for a Bangsa Moro Republik

The Mindanao problem has its roots in the way the Philippine nation-state was organized by the colonial powers and, subsequently, in the manner by which the independent Philippine state marginalized the people of Mindanao. The socioeconomic, political and demographic marginalization of the Muslims, coupled with the deep-seated prejudice between Muslims and Christians during the height of the “Moro Wars” to the present, served as a potent motive for the continued quest for a Bangsa Moro[1] (Moro Nation). While various initiatives were explored to bring peace and development to the MINSUPALA region, the past and present initiatives failed to strengthen mutual trust. This is reflected in the absence of programmes that promote a meaningful and broader participation of the stakeholders. Amidst the complexity of the conflict, military solutions were often sought. Likewise, power sharing, though merely a token gesture was tried and “development” was considered to be the magical solution that would resolve the history-old conflict. By heavily relying on military-politico and economic options, the equally important and powerful cultural dimension of the conflict was relegated to the sidelines.

1. Brief History

Prior to Spanish “discovery” in 1521, the Philippines was composed of independent communities. Most were pagan except for the Muslims who were already practicing a syncretic form of Islam (Cardenas 1976). The Moros lived in established communities in Mindanao, Sulu, and Palawan. They were organized into sultanates manifesting an advanced stage of political development compared to the northern and central parts of the Philippines.
Saleeby Najeeb (1963), a noted American scholar and technocrat during the American occupation noted that in the Sultanate of Sulu “[B]esides separate departments for administration of justice, and the church, they had others for war, the navy, and the treasury.” Supporting its advanced political development was the sultanate’s active participation in international trade, and the recognition of its sovereignty or independence accorded to it by foreign powers as indicated by its treaty relations with Spain, France, the Netherlands, Britain and U.S.A. (Abubakar 1979). As Constantino (1985) pointed out,

[the] Muslim society had already attained a fairly high level of social organization and material prosperity even before Spanish colonization. It therefore possessed human and material resources and built-in cultural defenses against any foreign intrusion.

The Sultanate of Sulu, a state in its own right, was established in 1450 under Sultan Syed Abu Bakr, a Mecca-born Arab trader. The Sulu Sultanate fought the Spaniards for 333 years and remained free until 1898 when the Republic of the Philippines declared its independence. The Sultanate of Maguindanao, formed in 1619 by Sultan Kudarat from the two powerful datuships of Rajah Buayan and Maguindanao, also fought the Spanish colonizers and remained independent until 1898. The political leaders of the United States were aware of the three independent states but preferred to ignore their existence. When the United States paid the 20 million Mexican dollars to Spain for the purchase of the Philippine archipelago in 1898, they claimed that there were no other nations in existence at that time, only scattered tribes fighting one another, thereby deflecting any possible accusation of invading free nation states (Rodil 1998).
In 1946, independence was given back to the Republic of the Philippines, but not to the Sultanates of Sulu and Maguindanao. The indigenous peoples in the Philippines did not have any social structures meriting the status of state, in the western sense, but contributed immensely to the anti-colonial struggle. The peoples of the Cordillera fought off the Spaniards successfully until 1898 and were never colonized. The Aetas of Luzon, Mangyans of Mindoro, the indigenous peoples of Palawan, and the Lumad[2] of Mindanao evaded contact with the Spaniards and remained free. Those who were colonized and became Christians fought to eventually realize the Republic of the Philippines. Those who fought the Spanish and were never colonized and those who remained free by evading contact with the colonizers all now suffer the status of cultural minorities (Rodil 1998).
Even after the colonizers left, the marginalization of the Moros in their homeland continued. Between 1950 and 1960, Christian prospectors, industrialists, loggers, and politicians, in collaboration with the Moro elite, dispossessed Moros and Lumad of their lands through fraudulent land titles, tedious application procedures, and costly legal processes (Tan 1977). The policy of land registration, the establishment of a western judicial system, and the resettlement of Mindanao by Christians resulted in the minoritization of Moros and Lumad in their ancestral land. Dispossessed of their lands by law, and alienated from their Islamic laws and customary legal practices, the minorities turned to ethnonationalism.

2. The Contemporary Armed Conflict

The postwar resurgence of Islam in the 1960s, through the missions of Muslim preachers to Mindanao and the offering of scholarships to young Moros to attend Islamic universities in Cairo and Medina, had a significant effect on Moro social and cultural awareness. Since then, mosques, madaris (Islamic schools), and Moro associations have flourished. The sense of Moro nationalism strengthened, and the term Bangsa Moro came into being (Che Man 1990). As Moro nationalism grew, so did the awareness of the need to defend the Islamic way of life and the Moro communities in Mindanao (Nunez 1997). However, the height of Moro nationalism and its eventual systematic campaign against the Manila government for the establishment of a Bangsa Moro took place after the Jabidah massacre on Corregidor Island on 18 March, 1968[3].
The incident incensed Moro aristocrats, politicians, and youth, as well as the Islamic countries. Muslims believed that the unfortunate tragedy that befell the youthful trainees, hidden from the public, happened only because they were Muslims (Tan 1993). It served as an impetus for the formation of the Bangsa Moro Liberation Organization (BMLO). Though ethnically divided, leaders of the movement decided to create a united front of the three largest Muslim groups in the archipelago: the Maranao, Maguindanao, and the Tausug (including Sama). The first batch of Moro youth sent to Sabah, Malaysia for combat and military training came from these three major groups. Three of these youths emerged as leaders of the three ethnic components of what later became the Moro National Liberation Front: Nur Misuari, a Tausug who became the chairperson; Hashim Salamat, a Maguindanao; and Dimas Pundato, a Maranao.
The emergence of the MNLF resulted in a systematic military counter campaign by the national government coupled with Christian countermoves. In the province of Cotabato, the Ilaga, a paramilitary organization that became known for its uncompromising anti-Muslim sentiments was organized. It was composed initially, as reported in the media, of Ilongo (natives of Panay) underworld characters. The founders, too, were all Ilongos. Moros suspected that the Ilaga had links with the Philippine military. On the other hand, the Moros organized the Blackshirts of Maguindanao and Cotabato and the Barracudas of Lanao del Sur. Christians tagged these as members of the Bangsa Moro Army of the MNLF. The fights between the Christian Ilaga and the Moro Blackshirts and Barracudas, in addition to the war waged by the MNLF against the Philippine military, resulted in numerous violent deaths on both sides and the dislocation of many, causing a wave of internal refugees. These paramilitary groups sowed fear and hatred and fanned the biases and prejudices between Christians and Moros.

a. The Causes of the Conflict

The causes of the contemporary Mindanao conflict have been stated to be economic deprivation, lack of political participation, inadequate or poor delivery of health and social services, lack of infrastructure, and minority-majority structural distractions (Cojuanco 1988). Macapado Muslim (1994) identifies six major grievances from the Moro perspective, namely, economic marginalization and destitution; political marginalization; non-preservation of Muslim identity; general feeling of physical insecurity (individually and collectively); the perception that the government was responsible or the party to blame for much of their suffering and insecurity; and a feeling of hopelessness under the existing political and economic order.
On the other hand, Nunez (1997) sees the cause of the Mindanao conflict as beyond economics and politics. By studying the Muslim and Christian perceptions, she argues that the roots of the conflict go deep into the collective consciousness of the people in the island and the country. She finds that the level of interpersonal values (i.e., need for status, recognition, and community) is the most fundamental dimension of the Mindanao conflict. This is the Moro’s perceived discrepancy between what they desire for themselves and their children and what they feel they can realistically achieve. She calls for the creation of equal opportunities for the attainment of values common to both Moro and Christian, and for tolerance of differences and empathy for each other’s commonalities. As conflict begins in the minds of men, she states, it is where the solution should first aim. Nunez believes that the existing political and economic attempts to bring peace in Mindanao will fall short in the long term, if the existing prejudices between Mindanao Muslims and Christians are not immediately addressed. The conflict in Mindanao, which started as a struggle for territorial integrity, in the course of its long history, has developed an economic, political and cultural dimensions too difficult to sort out.

b. The Costs of the Conflict

Since the contemporary Mindanao war erupted in 1972, it is estimated that 120,000 lives have been lost, countless more people wounded, and billions of pesos lost in the damage to property (Nunez 1997). Moreover, there has emerged a generation of orphans today concentrated in war-torn areas of Mindanao. Likewise, more than one million persons have been rendered homeless and destitute, and 200,000 to 300,000 Muslim refugees from this region have been reported to be in Sabah, Malaysia (Muslim 1994). Many more migrated to Metro Manila (estimated to be about 50,000) and other safer parts of the country. It was reported that as of 1976, 200,000 houses have been burned; 535 mosques and 200 schools demolished; and, 35 cities and towns wholly destroyed (cited in Ahmad 2000a).
It was reported that between 1972 to 1977, the first five years of the war, annual military expenditures rose from PhP51.8 million to PhP3.5 billion, or by almost 700 percent, while the personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) rose from 60,000 to 250,000 (Ahmad 2000). At the height of the conflict, it was reported that about 80 per cent of the entire military strength of the country were in Mindanao. The late President Marcos claimed that about 11,000 soldiers were killed during the first eight years of the war in Mindanao.
Economic and social costs have also been huge. To counter the secessionist movement in Mindanao, the Marcos administration increased its military spending to twice that spent on health or education. Due to the conflict, many arable lands were left unproductive and communities abandoned in Mindanao. Investors were scared away. Properties were destroyed and many communities deprived of basic social services. Local political and social institutions were weakened as the military and the national government took charge. The psychological damage to communities where Moros and Christians had peacefully co-existed was immeasurable.
While the exact cost of the Mindanao conflict will never be known, however, its real cost is definitely reflected in the present unequal development of various communities in Mindanao. In areas where the fighting was intense such as Cotabato, Maguindanao, Lanao del Sur, Sulu, Tawi-tawi, and Basilan, development is limited, governance is weak, if not absent, and poverty is endemic.

B. The Mindanao Initiatives of the Colonial and Post Colonial Powers
The colonial powers and the subsequent Philippine government undertook various initiatives to resolve the Moro problem in the Southern Philippines. A combination of armed and diplomatic means was employed, but failed to fully integrate the Moro into the wider, Christian dominated Philippine state. As the nation-state project progressed, the policies became more detrimental to the Moro people. Many of the colonizer’s policies alienated the Moro from their traditions and deprived them of their socio-economic and political power. Whatever is lost to them is a gain to Christians that now settle in Mindanao in search of its promise. While many Moros have died resisting state policies, the toll is more in the deepening of biases and prejudices between groups. The Moros fought for no less than the preservation of their territory and their Islamic way of life. The more the various initiatives have failed, the more the Moros are convinced that their struggle can only be resolved through the establishment of an independent Bangsa Moro Republik.

1. The Cross and Swords of the Spanish Conquistadores

After the “discovery” of the Philippines and the start of the nation-state project by the Spaniards, various initiatives were undertaken by the Spaniards to pacify/integrate and suppress Moro opposition. The objective of Spain was to increase the territorial domains of the Crown and to Christianize the local population (Che Man 1990). The Spaniards found it easy to subjugate the inhabitants of the central and northern part of the Philippine islands, but they failed miserably in the south, despite their dispatch of repeated military expeditions. The Christianized natives, who were called Indios, were mobilized to feed the Spanish war machine during the “Moro Wars” between the Spaniards and the Moro, characterized by almost continuous state of battle, raid and counter-raid for more than 300 years (Majul 1973). On the other hand, Christians critical of the Spanish friars and Spanish authorities and other criminal elements were exiled to the south. Famous among these was Dr. Jose Rizal who was sent to Dapitan; later he was made a hero by the Americans for his resistance against the Spanish.
The Spanish policy toward the Muslim south proved to have enduring consequences for the present “majority-minority” relations in the Moroland or in the Philippines as a whole. Dr. Cesar Majul (1971, p. 14) briefly describes the beginning of enmity between the two groups,
The Spaniards made full utilization of native troops, principally Visayans, Pampangos and Christianized natives of Northern Mindanao, to fight their wars against the Muslims of Sulu and Mindanao…Indios were made to row the boats of the Spaniards, serve as spearmen or shock troops, act as spies, and perform other mercenary tasks for their conquerors…As a response to all these, the Muslims began to hate and despise natives who do not only failed to preserve their freedom but were also used to deprive others of freedom for the sake of aliens. In the vocabulary of the Muslims, the word “Visayan” became synonymous to “slave”; while the words “Filipino” and Christian” became identified with each other. In brief, the Moro was, to his own mind, neither a slave nor a Filipino.

The Spanish deliberately fostered religious antagonism and consistently portrayed derogatory images of the Muslims in order to mobilize the Indios to fight the Moro. The Catholic Church of the time popularized the so-called “Moro-Moro” plays, depicting the fight between the good (the Christian) and the evil (the Muslims) leading always to the victory of the Christians against the Moros and their faith. It became a powerful cultural tool as the Moro-Moro became an integral part of folk and religious festivals (Salgado 1981). Campado’s (1996) analysis of the Spanish documents in Blair and Robertson’s 55-volume work were replete with negative images of the Moros, such as “had fierce and violent natures”, “treacherous and of little faith”, “cruel enemies”, “unfaithful”, “fawning”, “perfidious Mahometans”, “evils of so grievous a crime”, “ferocious character”, and infidel races”. The above “created a bitter enmity between two groups, despite the many similarities in their socio-cultural heritage” (Che Man 1990, p. 22). The present antagonism between the two groups finds its root in the Spanish colonial adventurism in the past.
While the Spanish had not successfully colonized Mindanao, in the second quarter of the nineteenth century they started the large-scale relocation of Christian Filipinos from the north to the sparsely populated south in order to colonize it by ‘proxy’. Christian migration to the south was substantial by the end of the Spanish regime (Che Man 1990, p. 23).
As a whole, while the Spaniards may have not conquered the Moroland, they somehow started the process of its peripheralization. What actually happened was “blockage without conquest.” Due to this, the flourishing trade and commerce at the height of the sultanate collapsed; shipbuilders and navigators became pirates, in local waters; the constant warfare affected agricultural production and pushed people from coastal plains and rich valleys to remote mountainous terrain. Direct producers were ruined as they supported the machinery of war but, at the same time, the members of the elite consolidated their social position in their new role as leaders of the anti-colonial struggle.

2. The American Eagle Claws and the Mindanao Crescent

The succession of the United States as the new colonial master replacing the Spaniards by virtue of the Treaty of Paris in 1898 did not come without resistance from the Christianized north, who were already on their way to inaugurating the new Philippine Republic. The U.S. did not immediately unleash its fury against the Moro. Instead, Brigadier-General John Bates of the U.S. Army concluded the Bates Agreement in 1899 with Sultan Jamalul Kiram of Sulu in an effort to gain Moro recognition of U.S. sovereignty over Mindanao and Sulu and to keep the Moros out of the Philippine-American War (1899-1901). Aside from acknowledging American sovereignty, the Sultan of Sulu “pledged to help suppress piracy and arrest individuals charged with crimes against non Moros” while the U.S. government in return agreed to “protect Moros from foreign intrusions and to respect the authority of the Sultan and other chiefs” (Che Man 1990, p. 47). However, Forbes (1985) has argued that the Sultan of Sulu had in mind only mere recognition and respect of the American flag, not relinquishment of sovereignty.
However, the policy of strict non-interference (Miller 1982 cited in Che Man 1990) was soon replaced by a policy of direct engagement, shortly after the Philippine-American War was over. The American military might and direct administration of Mindanao greatly altered the way of life of the Moro. It also facilitated the emergence of “majority-minority” relations in the Moroland though a policy of systematic Christian migration to the south. Pockets of Moro resistance began to dwindle through the years and the American occupation of Moroland proved to be gaining ground as more of the traditional elites became co-opted by the system through perks and privileges. The change in American policy to one of direct control could be seen in the administrative structure put in place in Mindanao.

Moro Province (1903-1913)
The transition of the American policy of non-interference to that of direct control resulted in the establishment of Moro Province. This abrogated the earlier Bates agreement. The creation of Moro Province divided Mindanao into five administrative districts, namely, Zamboanga, Lanao, Cotabato, Davao and Sulu altered the traditional political structure of the Moroland, the Sultanates. To enforce its will on the Moro people, whom the American considered “’savages’ whose laws and customs were not worth preserving “ (Che Man 1990, p. 48), Moro Province was administered by military generals.
Guided by the policy declared by Pres. William McKinley in 1899, which states: “The Philippines is ours, not to exploit but to develop, to civilize, to educate, to train in the science of self government” (quoted in Harrison 1922, p. 36), various policy instruments were put in place which altered the ways of life of the Moro people alienating them from their Islamic religion and traditional ways of life.
Programme to ‘develop’, ‘civilize’, ‘educate’ were introduced.

Well-ordered provincial and district governments were introduced. Schools and hospitals on the western model were built. Agriculture and commerce were expanded. Certain practices of the Moros, such as slavery, were made illegal. Furthermore, Filipino Christians from the Northern Provinces were encouraged to migrate to Moroland. It was all essential from the American point of view that the other forms of levies, such as export-import duties and vessel registration fees, were imposed (Che Man 1990, p. 48).

All these policies were considered by the Moro as a serious threat to their distinct Muslim ummah (community). The impact of the American imposed policies in Moroland could be summarized as follows:
The creation of the provincial and district units of government whose officials enforced laws and regulations weakened the power and position of the Moro leaders. The American public school system undermined the Moro pendita schools. The parceling of lands to Christian settlers not only took from the Moros their major economic resource but also threatened their traditional practice of ancestral landholding (Che Man 1990, p. 48).

Seeing the evil effects of the imposition of laws and customs of the foreigners and of kuffar (infidels), Jihad was declared. Various Moro resistance movement were organized; thousands of Moros died fighting in vain. The battled of Bud Dajo in 1906 and the Bud Bagsak in 1913 are remembered as among the bloodiest battles in Moroland during the early period of American colonization. They are considered as massacres of the Moro by the Americans. The Moro resistance was significantly weakened after that.

Department of Mindanao and Sulu (1914-1920)
Because of the relatively successful pacification campaign in Moroland during the time of Moro Province, and upon the wishes of the Democratic Party of the United States to facilitate Philippine independence under the principle of “the Philippines for the Filipinos”, Moro Province was reorganized into the Department of Mindanao and Sulu. The new department was placed under the jurisdiction of the insular government, headed by a civilian administrator, and was tasked to unify Mindanao and Sulu with Luzon and the Visayas. It was specifically mandated “to transfer the control of Moro affairs from the Americans to Filipinos, and to continue the socio-political development of the Moro people with the aim of accelerating their integration” (Che Man 1990, p. 51).
Two policy directions were pushed during this period. The “Filipinization policies” were aimed at giving Filipino Christians greater power in the administration of the Moroland, more particularly in the civil service and in education. The “policy of attraction” which stressed the improvement of Moro welfare was pursued to further the integration of the Moros. Noted among these programs is the pensionado program that was used effectively to co-op Muslim elite. It was a scholarship program for Moroland higher education by which recipients were sent to Manila and the United States to study American values and institutions. The Department of Mindanao and Sulu was credited with weakening Moro resistance and accelerating Moro integration into a unified, self governing Philippines (Silva 1979).

Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes (1920-1937)
The successful conclusion of its task resulted in its abolition and replacement by the newly created Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes which was firmly in the hands of Christian Filipinos. The new bureau was placed under the supervision of the Department of Interior. Though the Americans continued to play an important role in the administration of Moroland, Christian Filipinos played a significant role with respect to domestic matters. For example, the Philippine Legislature had the power to veto the acts of the American Governor Generals in the appointment of provincial governors and other key officials in Moroland, including the appropriation of funds thereto.
With a massive dose of American education, it is not surprising that many Muslim leaders preferred to be under the American tutelage. Significant during this period was the expressed preference of the leaders of Moroland to be directly governed by the Americans than by Christian Filipinos. The bitter experience of the Moro with the Christians acting as instruments of the Spaniards to stamp out Moro religion and tradition for more than 300 years is not difficult to understand. Moro leaders led by Datu Maulan of Jolo, Sulu, petitioned the U.S. Congress in 1926 to express their intention to declare independence should the US grant independence to the Philippines without provision for the retention of Moroland under American rule (Che Man 1990, p. 55). Similar sentiment was echoed by Muslim leaders in Lanao when they sent a petition to the Governor General “to allow them to remain under American rule ‘forever’ because they had no faith in Christian Filipinos treating them with equal justice” (Tan 1977, p. 102).
Despite Moro resistance to integration, either through pockets of armed rebellion or petitions and lobby, the United States remained steadfast in its policy of incorporating Moroland into Philippines. This was in line with the global economic interest of the United States – the entry of American corporations into resource-rich Mindanao. The opening of agricultural colonies and resettlement projects in Mindanao formed part of the U.S. economic interest. The Christian-led commonwealth government was inaugurated in November 1935. Subsequently, independence was granted in 1946.
3. The Commonwealth’s Filipinization of Moroland (1935-1946)

Just like the American colonizer, the new colonizer of the Moroland promised to serve the interests of the Moro. However, subsequent policies implemented in Moroland only deepened the Moro’s sense of alienation. Aside from the implementation of development programs largely for the benefit of the Christian settlers (Gowing 1979, p.176-78), special privileges extended to the Moro by the Americans were subsequently abolished, including, but not limited to, the repeal by the National Assembly of the Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu which gave Moros certain exemptions from national laws; the abolition of the Moro Board, which had been established to settle Moro’s disputes according to Islamic and traditional laws; and abolishing in 1937 the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribe, which had attempted to meet the special requirements of the Moro. It was replaced by the Office of the Commissioner for Mindanao and Sulu whose primary concern was the development of Mindanao for the immediate benefit of the Commonwealth as a whole (Thomas 1971, p. 271). Official recognition of the civil titles held by Moros as an expression of their traditional system was no longer allowed as the Commonwealth government refused to acknowledge the successor of Sultan Jamalul Kiram II of Sulu, who died in 1937. There was also a marked reduction of social and economic programs for the Moros.
While some Moro leaders were co-opted, there were also those who opted to challenge the new dispensation, but failed. Che Man (1990, p. 56) offers the following explanation why the Moro failed to stop the onslaught of the transformation of the Islamic culture and traditions in Moroland:

First, the Moro struggles were characterized by the absence of consistent and effective co-ordination and co-operation among different Muslim ethno-cultural groups and with other non-Christian tribes. This was explained by the fragmented nature of the Moro society and the mutual suspicion and distrust among various ethnic groups…Secondly, the less vigorous armed resistance during the period of civil administration (1914-34) and the commonwealth government (1935-46) compared to the era of military regime (1899-1913) was due mainly to the fact that the Moros had been largely disarmed and pacified and were exhausted. In addition, the nature of civilian administration was less repressive and more tolerable than that of the military regime. Hence, it received less forceful response from the Moros.

One of the greatest legacies of the American colonial rule, which has had far reaching implications until today, is its massive and permanent alteration of the demography of Mindanao and the ownership of land. The policy of integrating the Moros through the migration from the Christian north was effectively carried out. For merely 15 years of its occupation of Moroland (from 1903 to 1918), it was able to half the percentage of the population of Moroland (see Table 2). A similar policy was pursued more vigorously by the Commonwealth government through the 1935 Organic Charter of Organized Land Settlement whose political purpose was “[L]and settlement work is the only government activity that will furnish effective solution to the Mindanao problem” (quoted in Ahmad 2000b, p. 13). Not content with this action, the government organized the National Land Settlement Administration (NLSA) in 1939. It was tasked to facilitate the acquisition, settlement and cultivation of frontier areas in Mindanao.

The continuous colonization of Mindanao by the Commonwealth Government was rationalized in three ways. First, economic integration. The rich natural resources of Mindanao were a potential source of vital food supply and revenue for the entire country; Second, ethnic integration. To achieve this, the dispatch of Christian Filipinos to agricultural colonies in Moroland where they could co-exist with the Moro was necessary. It was hoped that they could “live together in perfect harmony and brotherhood” for the benefit of the new Philippine Republic. Finally, the settlement of Christian Filipinos would ease the growing agrarian unrest in the north brought about by over concentration of too much land in the hands of the northern elite (Silva 1979).

4. The Postwar Philippine Republic Integration Policy (1946-1968)

From independence in 1946 until 1968, Filipino leaders presumed that the Mindanao problem could be resolved by rapid integration of the Muslims into the new Filipino republic (Tan 1993). Many Muslim leaders shared this view and actively participated in national governance. Muslims, Christians, and non-Muslims participated in national and local elections. There were cases of Christians being elected in predominantly Muslim areas. To integrate the Muslims into the nation’s body politic, venues were created for the Muslim leadership to project their political and intellectual profiles in Philippine society. In 1957, the Commission on National Integration (CNI) was organized, followed by the establishment of the Mindanao State University (MSU) in 1968. Many Muslims and Christians benefited from these institutions. Several young leaders in the Muslim struggle emerged through scholarships offered by the CNI or through MSU’s academic activities (Tan 1993). However, the marginalization of the Moros did not end. Only the Moro elites were able to maintain their status, and benefited from the system. This pattern of integration continued until 1968 when the Jabidah massacre occurred.
In response to the massacre, the Moros waged a war of secession. The ideology of the time was that the Moros were Filipinos and therefore, belonged to the Philippine State. Alledging long neglect by the government, they said they were compelled to seek independence through armed means to establish the Bangsa Moro Republik (see Annex A). The government mobilized its military might to suppress the Moros’ struggle. Clashes between the military and the MNLF took place in Lanao, Cotabato, Zamboanga, and Basilan. The bloodiest confrontation took place in Sulu in 1974, razing the area to the ground. Hundreds of military men and mujaheedeen (freedom fighters) were killed. Residents were reduced to poverty resulting in their leaving the area. Many of them fled to Sabah, Malaysia. Sulu, once a powerful sultanate and a prosperous venue of international trade, became a “no man’s land.”
With both sides suffering heavy losses, the government and the MNLF searched for a pragmatic way of dealing with the issues. After a stalemate in 1975 the Marcos government tried a political settlement. It concluded a peace accord, the Tripoli Agreement, on 23 December 1976, under the mediation of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) (see Annex B). The accord defined the substantive principles for the establishment of autonomy and cease-fire among the thirteen provinces and nine cities of Mindanao, without damaging Philippine sovereignty (Tan 1993). Article 1 of the agreement called for “the establishment of Autonomy in Southern Philippines within the realm of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines”. The area of autonomy included: Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-tawi, Zamboanga del Sur, Zamboanga del Norte, North Cotabato, Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Davao del Sur, South Cotabato, Palawan and all the cities and villages situated in the above mentioned areas. Misuari considered the acceptance of autonomy as a “bitter pill to swallow” but they were faced with no choice because the MNLF depended on a number of OIC countries for military and financial support. Likewise, Article 3, Par. 15 mandates that “immediately after the signature of the agreement in Manila, a Provisional Government shall be established in the area of Autonomy…” While the Tripoli agreement signals the departure of the MNLF from secession to that of autonomy, it at the same time a tacit recognition of the rightful claim of the Moro to their homeland. The provinces and cities to be included in the Tripoli Agreement as areas of autonomy were actually the territories under the Sultanate of Sulu and Maguindanao. The agreement likewise affirmed and recognized the right of the Muslims to establish their own courts, their own educational, administrative, economic and financial systems. The specifics, however, were left for future discussions. However, there were disagreements regarding implementation of the accord (Rodil 1994). Article 3 Par. 16 of the Tripoli Agreement provides that “[T]he government of the Philippines shall take all necessary constitutional processes for the implementation of the entire agreement.” The government argued and pushed for the holding of a plebiscite to determine which of the thirteen provinces and nine cities were willing to be part of the autonomous region. Only ten provinces opted for autonomy. Marcos then created two autonomous regions, Region IX and Region XII by virtue of Presidential Decree 1618. The MNLF did not accept the government position and reverted to its secessionist stand. War resumed, mostly calculated and primarily for propaganda purposes. While the MNLF campaigned for regular membership in the OIC, the Marcos administration continued its military campaign and its co-opting of Muslim leaders.
The MNLF, a considerable force to reckon with in the 1980s, fragmented along ethnic lines: the Maranao faction under Dimas Pundato organized the MNLF-Reformist Group (RG) in 1982 and represented the traditional stream, and Hashim Salamat’s Maguindanao faction formed the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in 1984 and represented the Islamic revivalist group. The MNLF under Nur Misuari remained and represents the secular wing of the Moro people.

The Post-Marcos Governments and the Bangsa Moro Struggle

a. The Aquino Administration

The ouster of Marcos from power provided new optimism for the resolution of the conflict in the southern Philippines. When Corazon Aquino was inaugurated President in 1986, she tried to negotiate peace with the MNLF. To show her firm resolve to put an end to decades of bloodletting in the south, in a historic visit, President Aquino went to Jolo, Sulu, to meet with Nur Misuari on September 6, 1986 to talk peace. During the meeting, it was agreed to cease hostilities between the GRP and the MNLF and to start a series of formal discussions to arrive at a political solution of the Mindanao problems. What followed was series of formal and informal talks. The negotiators found difficulties in the issue of “territory, provisional government, democratic process and transfer of powers” (Ramos 1996, p. 30-1). Due to uncertainties in the Aquino formula to resolve the Mindanao conflict, the MNLF charged her government with insincerity, further creating suspicion. The government expressed willingness to negotiate, but only with a unified Muslim group. Misuari was unable to forge a unified front due to differences among the leaders of the MILF and MNLF-RG. The government, however, succeeded in softening the leadership of the other factions (Tan 1993). It established a patron-client relationship with the MNLF-RG and MILF and divided the Moro revolutionaries by provision of choice political positions and economic opportunities, including access to financial resources.
Capitalizing on her popularity, the Aquino government (1986-1992) in an effort to find a solution to the Mindanao problem successfully included in the 1987 constitution a provision on the state’s recognition of the rights of the Muslims of Mindanao and of the indigenous peoples of Cordillera (Article X, Section 15 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution). This constitutional provision paved the way for the establishment of an autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao, which resulted in the passage of the Republic Act 6734 on August 1, 1989, the act creating the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). After the plebiscite on November 19, 1989 of the thirteen provinces and nine cities covered by the Tripoli Agreement, only the four provinces of Maguindanao, Lanao del Sur, Sulu, and Tawi-tawi opted to join. The ARMM was officially inaugurated on June 6, 1990. The MNLF rejected the autonomy. It remained steadfast in its original proposition of “all (of the thirteen provinces and nine cities) or nothing.”

b. The Ramos Presidency
No president of the republic has equaled the zeal of Pres. Ramos in his desire to bring peace in Mindanao. Ramos is a military general who was instrumental during the EDSA Revolution in 1996 that toppled the Marcos dictatorship, and an active participant during the height of the military campaign in Mindanao, was privy to various negotiations to resolve the Bangsa Moro questions prior to his presidency. At the height of the presidential campaign in 1992, Ramos and Congressman De Venecia secretly went to Libya to visit Muamar Khaddafy “to discuss a comprehensive and permanent solution” to the Mindanao Conflict (Ramos 1996, p. 37).
After his assumption of power as president of the Republic, Ramos created the National Unification Commission (NUC) on July 28 1992 by issuing Executive Order No. 19. The NUC was tasked, among others, to “[F]ormulate and recommend, after consulting with concerned sectors of society, to the president…a viable general amnesty program and peace process that will lead to a just, comprehensive and lasting peace in the country”, “[R]eview and evaluate the existing National Reconciliation and Development Program…with the view of integrating the program into a general amnesty program and peace process;” and, “[C]all upon any official, agent, employee, agency or instrumentality of the national or local government for any assistance that may be necessary to carry out the purposes” of Executive Order No. 19.
After conducting numerous consultations in the entire country, the NUC submitted its consolidated recommendations to the President on July 1, 1993. Thereafter, on September 15, 1993, Pres. Ramos issued Executive Order No. 125, which defined the approach and administrative structure for the government’s comprehensive peace efforts (see Annex C). The “Six Paths to Peace” was formally adopted as the major components of the peace process. The Six Paths to Peace are
First. The pursuit of social, economic and political reforms which address the root causes of insurgency and social unrest;

Second. Consensus building and empowerment for peace, which seek to make consultations with the people a regular part of governance;

Third. Peace talks with the different rebel groups aimed at final negotiated settlements;

Fourth. Reconciliation, reintegration into society and rehabilitation of rebels, including amnesty and other measures to address the needs of former rebels, demobilized combatants and civilian victims of the armed conflicts;

Fifth. The protection of civilians and the de-escalation of conflict, which includes such measures as limited suspension of offensive military operations (SOMO), recognition of peace zones, intensified delivery of basic services to conflict areas and strict implementation of laws and policy guidelines for the protection of human rights; and

Sixth. The building of a positive climate for peace, which includes confidence-building measures between government and the rebel groups and peace advocacy and education for Philippines society as a whole.

The Office of the President for Peace Process (OPPP) was likewise created to continue the work begun by NUC. The Six Paths to Peace served as the guiding posts for the various peace initiatives undertaken by the Ramos administration. The process and the outcome of the peace process between the GRP and the MNLF is very much reflective of it.
Former President Fidel Ramos (president from 1992-1998) pursued the peace option out of the conviction that development could thrive only in an environment of peace. After four years of negotiation, the GRP and the MNLF, with the participation of the OIC concluded another peace agreement on 2 September 1996.

c. The Estrada Administration
During Estrada’s campaign in Mindanao, he promised to spend three months of the year in Mindanao. He was cheered in every town and cities he went. However, in his campaign platform “Vision of Governance” Danguilan-Vitug and Gloria (2000, p. 256) noted that the program for Mindanao “is on the last page with a list of roads to be built and no mention of the threat posed by the MILF, a peace strategy with the rebels, and rebuilding of war affected areas following the accord with the MNLF.” It is even worst in his better-looking 39-page “Framework of Governance,” a policy on Mindanao and the Muslim secessionist movement did not picture at all. This merely shows the lack of understanding and consciousness about the Mindanao problem by Estrada.
When Estrada was elected president, the only relief for many peace advocates in Mindanao was to find people appointed in the Estrada cabinet who were privy on the Mindanao peace process. Gen. Alexander Aguirre was appointed as the National Security adviser while Ambassador Manuel Yan was appointed as the president’s peace process adviser. Both gentlemen were key figures during the Ramos government’s peace negotiation with the MNLF. Sen. Orlando Mercado was appointed Secretary of National Defense. He was privy to the Mindanao situation in his capacity as chair of the Senate Committee on National Defense during the previous administration.
However, as the days went by, the prospects of peace and development in Mindanao became bleak. While the government concluded an initial peace agreement with the MILF on the general cessation of hostility in 1998, it did not last long. Aside from the “seemingly irreconcilable issues” between the MILFs position on “independent separate Islamic state” and the GRPs no compromise position on the “territorial integrity and sovereignty” of the Philippines, Fr. Mercado (1999) observed that “[T]he way the Estrada administration conducts the peace process in Mindanao, it appears like there is no short-and long-term vision to set direction to an agenda for the peace process.” Fr. Mercado (2000, p.2.) later noted that “while the peace talks between the GRP and the MILF were progressing well albeit beset by difficulty and problems, particularly on the implementation of the cease-fire agreement.” Prof. Rodil, a member of the Philippine Panel that negotiated with the MNLF, describes the GRP-MILF talks as
like seeing a good exciting movie with a very complex plot and numerous sub-plots woven into each other. One is never able to tell the rise and fall of the story or what the ending of each sub-plot will be. But unlike a movie that ends after an hour and a half, the ending of the peace talks is nowhere in sight.

In March 21, 2000, the peace talks between the GRP and the MILF collapsed when Pres. Estrada declared his “all-out war” policy in Mindanao. The government adopted once again a military solution when it declared a total war policy in MILF. The result of the military campaign was tragic, with no clear victors. The military campaign was more expensive than what was launched by Marcos and it displaced more civilians than Marcos did. The peace agreement with the MNLF remained but did not prosper. There was a failure to deliver the promised peace and development in SZOPAD.
Nothing was more ironic with the recent Mindanao war than the sudden rise from the all time low negative popularity rating of Estrada when he unleashed the “all out war policy” of his government. President Estrada will be remembered by the Moro people as the popular president whose incapacity to govern the country made his popularity dwindled beyond compare in the history of presidency of the republic. But unlike any other presidents, he was able to raise his popularity at the expense of the Moro people and at the expense of all the efforts invested to bridge the biases and prejudices between the Muslims and Christians. This particular current of showing deep-seated prejudice towards the Muslim people in the south was further re-enforced by Pres. Estrada himself in various interviews where he was quoted to have said “Pareho pareho lang sila” (they are all the same), “eh hindi naman sila mga Filipino eh” (they are not Filipinos) (Mercado 2000). It was noted that noted that “never has the Filipino Muslims felt so marginalized, “hated,” persecuted, endangered” than under the Estrada’s 395 days (Arguillas 2000). In some areas in Mindanao, the anti-Muslim passions gave rise to the organization of Christian vigilantes reminiscent of the 70’s (PDI 2000).
Frustrated with the Mindanao policy of the Estrada government, Nur Misuari lambasted the government during May 2000 meeting of the OIC’s senior officials in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia and during the OIC’s International Conference of Foreign Ministers in Kuala Lumpur in June 2000. Misuari warned that the MNLF would be left with no other option but independence if “genuine autonomy” under the Tripoli agreement was not implemented. His remarks provoked storm of criticism from congressional leaders and from the Estrada administration (Arguillas 2000; Javellana and Senase 2000; Cueto 2000). Nur Misuari was short of becoming declared as persona non grata in his own country.

C. The September 2, 1996 Agreement

The signing of the agreement set the tone for all the peace and development initiatives that came to SZOPAD. The opening line of the agreement states: “the final agreement on the implementation of the Tripoli Agreement.” This illustrates the desire to reach an agreement on the implementation of the Tripoli Agreement signed on 23 December 1976. There are 154 points of consensus in the agreement and it is divided into two phases (see Annex D).

1. Phase 1
Phase one of the peace agreement covers the period from 1996 to 1999. It is a three-year transition period starting after the signing of the peace agreement and calls for the establishment of the Special Zone of Peace and Development in Southern Philippines (SZOPAD), the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD), and the SPCPD Consultative Assembly. During this phase, the process of integration of MNLF elements with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP) will commence.
The peace agreement calls for the establishment of a SZOPAD covering fourteen (14) provinces namely, Palawan, Tawi-tawi, Sulu, Basilan, Zamboanga del Norte, Zamboanga del Sur, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Cotabato, Maguindanao, Davao del Sur, Sultan Kudarat, South Cotabato and Sarangani, and ten (10) cities namely General Santos City, Cotabato City, Kidapawan City, Marawi City, Iligan City, Pagadian City, Dapitan City, Dipolog City, Zamboanga City, and Puerto Princesa.
To ensure that peace and development projects and programmes are effectively implemented in the SZOPAD area, the peace pact calls for the creation of SPCPD, under the Office of the President. This is a three-year transition mechanism that will oversee development efforts in the SZOPAD area. It is tasked to monitor, promote, and coordinate the development efforts in the area, including the attraction of foreign investment, especially from OIC member countries and the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations or ASEAN. The SPCPD is composed of one (1) Chairman, one (1) Vice Chairman and three deputies, one each representing the Muslims, the Christians and the cultural communities. It is assisted by the Darul Iftah (advisory council) which shall be created by the Chairman. Prof. Nur Misuari, Chairman of the MNLF and elected Governor of the ARMM, chairs the SPCPD and presides over the Consultative Assembly.
The SPCPD Consultative Assembly was also organized and is composed of 81 members: the Chairman of the SPCPD, the Governor and Vice-Governor of ARMM, the 14 Governors of the provinces and 10 City Mayors in SZOPAD, 44 members from the MNLF and 11 members from various sectors recommended by non-government organizations (NGOs) and peoples’ organizations (POs). It is mandated to promote, monitor, and coordinate improvement of peace and order; focus on peace and development efforts particularly in the depressed areas; induce the implementation of peace and development projects; provide support to LGUs as necessary; assist the Commission on Election (COMELEC) on election-related matters; and perform other activities as may be delegated by the president. Further, the SPCPD Consultative Assembly exercises the following functions and powers: a) serves as a forum for consultation and ventilation of issues and concerns; b) conducts public hearings as may be necessary and to provide appropriate advice to the SPCPD; and c) formulates and recommends policies to the president through the Chairman of the SPCPD and makes rules and regulations to the extent necessary for the effective and efficient administration of the affairs of the area.
To ensure that peace and development projects and programs are effectively accomplished in SZOPAD, various government instrumentalities were placed under the control and/or supervision of the SPCPD, to wit: the southern Philippine Development Authority (SPDA); regional and field offices of the Office of Muslim Affairs (OMA) and the Office of the Southern Cultural Communities (OSCC) which are situated and operating in SZOPAD; the various tasks forces created by the government, such as the Basilan Development Task Force (formerly Task Force Basilan), the Central Mindanao Task Force (the former Task For MALMAR), and the Sulu Development Task Force; and, the Special Development Planning Task Group (SDPTG) - an ad hoc body composed of staff officers and planning experts of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA), the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), and other agencies.
During Phase 1, the process of integration of 5,750 MNLF elements in the AFP would take place. The inclusion of additional 1,750 MNLF elements with the PNP as part of the regular police recruitment programme would also take place during this phase.
Furthermore, the agreement (No. 20) calls for “special socio-economic, cultural and educational programs to cater to MNLF forces not absorbed into the AFP, PNP and SRSF to prepare them and their families for productive endeavors, provide for educational, technical skills and livelihood training and give them priority in development projects” (emphasis mine). This serves as the entry point and justification for the involvement of the donor community in SZOPAD

Phase 2.
While peace and development programmes are being implemented in the SZOPAD, a bill to amend or repeal RA 6734 shall be initiated within Phase 1. The bill shall include the pertinent provisions of the Final Peace Agreement and the expansion of the present ARMM area of autonomy. After a law shall have been passed by Congress and approved by the President, it shall be submitted to the people for approval in a plebiscite in the affected areas, within two years from the establishment of the SPCPD (that is in 1998).
The pertinent, but highly contentious, provisions of the final agreement, which shall be recommended by the government to congress for incorporation in the amendatory or repealing law pertains to the power and structure of the executive council, legislative assembly and the administrative system of the new regional autonomous region and its representation in the national government (agreement 21 to 72); the establishment of the special security force for the autonomous region (agreement 73 to93); system of education (agreement 94-125); the economic and financial system, mines and minerals (agreement 126 to151); and, the establishment of the Shari’ah (Islamic) courts (agreement 152).

3. The Implications of the Peace Agreement
The creation of the SZOPAD and the SPCPD has its own political agenda such as temporary power-sharing, and sufficient time to get support for the autonomy. However, it also has peace implications. Even though temporary, the signing of the accord means cessation of hostilities between the government forces and the MNLF. The cessation of hostilities in the SZOPAD would mean that people could live in a more secure environment and conduct their daily lives without fear and with a sense of normalcy.
The designation of the SZOPAD indicated that the region would benefit from resources provided by the national government and multilateral and bilateral agencies. The national focus on the region would be an opportunity for the SZOPAD to reverse its dismal development and realize its vast potential. It was hoped that this designation would result in the inflow of many development projects and investments. The Muslims and Lumads would hopefully receive greater attention through the implementation of various affirmative action programmes in their communities ranging from capacity-building and livelihood assistance to infrastructure development.
The formation of the SPCPD, given its tri-people composition (Muslims-Lumads-Christians) has provided an opportunity for leaders of the region to collectively dissect the peace and development needs of the area and propose solutions. The full participation of the MNLF leaders in mainstream peaceful political processes has been achieved. By coming together to address the issues of the region, there has been at the same time an opportunity to lessen and eventually eradicate the entrenched animosities among the leaders. Finally, the SPCPD as a “bottom-up” approach has been an opportunity for the residents of SZOPAD to address the SZOPAD issue from their point of view.
The former MNLF combatants, who will be integrated with the national police and armed forces, will take an active part in protecting peace and order in the region. For those who will not be integrated, there are now numerous opportunities to take part in productive activities, and resume a normal life.
While the first phase of implementation of the accord is a welcome development as everybody hopes for peace and development, the second phase is likely to be contentious if not explosive. The functioning of the autonomous region, of which the structure and internal processes are yet undetermined, will be difficult. The signing of the peace accord in 1996 was greeted with strong opposition among various sectors in the communities under the SZOPAD, mostly among Christians. Many of the fears are actually unfounded. While the accord proposes a separate local government code for the region, many local executives feared that it might diminish their current powers under the Local Government Code of 1991. For others, the prospect of their children learning Moro history and values is unacceptable. Rumors of the possible banning of pork consumption in accordance with Muslim beliefs have also disturbed the Christian population.
The campaign for autonomy is expected to be divisive. Those interests affected by the formation of the autonomous region will again exaggerate old stereotypes. Old antagonisms will be revived to oppose any move for the perceived “Islamization” of the areas contested.
This scenario could be avoided if:
The programmes strengthen mutual trust;

The tri-people of Mindanao will clearly perceive, if not enjoy, the benefits of autonomy; and

Civil society will play a vital role in shaping public opinion and directing the course of development rather than leaving it to traditional institutions (e.g. politicians, elites, church, and mass media) who were in some respects parties to be blamed for the Mindanao war.

Finally, until the people in the SZOPAD become participants in determining the structure and processes of the autonomous region, the prospects of reaching the goal of setting up autonomy that encompasses all the areas under the SZOPAD is bleak.

4. Challenges Ahead
While the signing of the peace agreement and the laying out of plans for SZOPAD lead to optimism for many, the peace accord has not been free of problems that would serve as a challenge for the stakeholders. First, there is the development challenge: a high incidence of poverty, over exploitation of natural resources and severe degradation of the environment; inadequate basic social services and livelihood support mechanisms (infrastructure, credit and lending institutions, institutional support); limited participation of the poor; and the peace and order condition (Fuentes 1998). Of course, good governance remains critical.
Second, the political challenge. What is now clear is that Misuari, the Chair of the MNLF, agreed to settle the Mindanao problem through the constitutional process. It remains debatable whether he and his group will abide by the result of the plebiscite. It is also important to add that in the spirit of “dignity for all” the agreement did not call for the demobilization of MNLF forces, nor do the MNLF consider themselves ex-combatants (see Annex E). On the other hand, it is still uncertain as to what kind of concessions the government can offer the MILF, another faction of the Moro people, with whom it is presently negotiating.
Finally, making the peace agreement succeed requires enormous financial resources, political will, creativity, and patience. MNLF leaders claim to have been promised by the Philippine government a mini-Marshall plan for SZOPAD during the negotiations. When the agreement was signed, the economy was in deep crisis. Two years after the signing of the agreement, of the PhP41.9 billion appropriated by the Philippine government to develop SZOPAD, only PhP2.8 billion had been released (Abidin 1998). Gov. Misuari has never missed an opportunity to criticize the national government for its failure to provide adequate funds, even just for the ARMM. In 1997 when he assumed office, the ARMM had a budget of only PhP3.1 billion, not even enough to pay its 19,000 employees.
[1] To feed its war campaign for independence, the MNLF defined the Bangsa Moro as a national identity of all Southern Philippine ethnic Muslims who shared a common faith, a history of pre-conquest, political organization under the sultanates and colonial experience of an alien power imposing its will on them. When MNLF took the path of negotiations, it required a broader constituency to rally around its bargaining position for autonomy. “Bangsa Moro” came to be defined as “all indigenous inhabitants of Mindanao,” i.e. ethnic Muslims plus non-Muslim ethnic tribes or Lumads (Fuentes 1998).
[2] The word “Lumad” is a Cebuano Bisayan word meaning indigenous which became a collective name for the 18 ethnolinguistic groups of Mindanao, namely: Ata, Bagobo, Banwaon, B’laan, Bukidnon, Dibabawon, Higaunon, Kalagan, Mamanwa, Mandaya, Mangguwangan, Manobo, Mansaka, Subanon, Tagakaolo, T’boli, Tiruray, and Ubo (Rodil 1994).
[3] This was a massacre by the Philippine Army, of twenty-eight to sixty-four Moro youth allegedly among the 180 trainees of the Jabidah forces. The trainees were supposedly part of a secret scheme by Marcos to split the Islamic ranks, provoke a war between Sulu and Sabah, and then invade and reclaim Sabah. The lone survivor of the killing stated that the trainees were shot after they refused to attack Sabah, because the army feared a leakage of the plan.

Friday, November 14, 2008

Drum and Bugle Presentation on December 3

Song Writing Contest Mechanics

The Moro History (Received from Prof. Aguha)

Followers

Blog Archive

Friday, November 14, 2008

Drum and Bugle Presentation on December 3

Song Writing Contest Mechanics

The Moro History (Received from Prof. Aguha)

Subscribe To

Followers

Blog Archive